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STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
As explained in detail in this Brief, this appeal is taken 
from one of three cases which were consolidated in the district 
court. Not all parties to the litigation appear in the caption of 
this appeal. In compliance with Rule 24(a)(1), the following list 
of additional parties from all three cases which do not appear in 
the caption is submitted: Rockwood Insurance Company; Arizona All-
Claims, Inc.; Utah All-Claims, Inc.; Ray Summers; and Paul 
Scurlock. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction 
under §78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court exercised its authority 
under §78-2-2(4) to transfer this case to the Utah Court of Appeals 
in an Order to that effect, dated February 20, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for appellate review: 
1. Did the district court err by ruling that a general 
release, dated July 12, 1985, executed by the plaintiff and later 
affirmed by him, did not release the defendant known as The Putter 
Club? 
This issue is a question of law for which this court may 
substitute its judgment for that of the district court. Henretty 
v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the district court err in failing to find that this 
action was barred by the one-action rule when children of the 
deceased filed first another wrongful death action which was 
settled? 
This issue is one of law for which this court need not defer 
to the trial court. HenrettyP id. 
3. Did the plaintiff waive the right to pursue a wrongful 
death claim in this case when he elected to affirm the general 
release he earlier executed and further chose to pursue a fraud 
claim in a related case? 
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This issue is also a question of law for which this appellate 
court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the district 
court. Henretty, id. 
4. Did the district court err in refusing to allow The 
Putter Club credit against the judgment in this case for all funds 
received by the plaintiff as settlement of his related fraud 
action? 
This issue is also a question of law for which this appellate 
court may substitute its judgment. Henretty, id. 
5. Did the district court err by refusing to allow The 
Putter Club advise the jury at trial of the amount of settlement 
received by all heirs, including the plaintiff, in all related 
actions because of the death of Marilyn Stalboerger? 
This is a question of law for which this appellate court may 
substitute its judgment. Henretty, id. 
6. Did the district court err in allowing punitive damages 
to be considered and awarded by the jury against an employer 
corporation for the acts of its employee? 
This is a question of law for which the appellate court may 
substitute its judgment. Henretty. id. 
7. Assuming the plaintiff can establish that punitive 
damages are legally available under the circumstances established 
by the evidence, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the large 
award of punitive damages? 
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This is a question of fact for which this court should sustain 
the jury verdict so long as there is ample evidence to support the 
award. Penrod v. Carter. 737 P. 2d 199 (Utah 1987). 
8. Were the remarks in the rebuttal portion of the closing 
argument of plaintiff's counsel to the effect that the jury should 
send the private club industry in Utah "a message" by the amount of 
the damages they award constitute prejudicial, improper argument 
which justifies a new trial? 
This is a question of law for which the appellate court may 
substitute its judgment. Henretty, id. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant claims that the following law bears directly upon 
the issues presented and are reproduced in the Addendum to this 
Brief: 
§37-11-1, U.C.A. (1953) 
§78-11-7, U.C.A (1953) 
§78-27-42, U.C.A. (1953) 
Please note: all of the foregoing statutes have been repealed 
or amended since this accident. The statutes reproduced in the 
Addendum are those in effect at the time of the accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action against a dram shop by a surviving husband 
for the wrongful death of his wife in an automobile accident. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. Introduction 
This case is unusually complicated procedurally for a tort 
case. The complication arises out of the filing of three cases by 
different heirs concerning facts of one automobile accident. The 
result is the involvement of three district judges, probably a 
dozen legal counsel, multiple parties, and interrelated claims. 
An understanding of the nature of each of the three lawsuits 
is vital to resolution of the issues presented in this brief. What 
follows is a statement of the course of proceedings for each of the 
three cases. Addendum "A" contains a pictorial summary of each of 
these cases. Addendum "B" is a roster of names with a brief 
statement of identity of each. 
B. Stalboerger v. Rockwood Ins. Co., et al. 
On January 22, 1986, the first lawsuit, case #86-494, was 
filed by John Stalboerger, husband of the decedent, against the 
Rockwood Insurance Company, Redwood Industries, Inc., and Joe B. 
Turpin. R., p. 1A. Rockwood Insurance Company was the insurer of 
the alleged drunk driver in the automobile accident and, by coinci-
dence, the insurer of the vehicle in which the deceased was riding. 
R. , pp. 1A - 2. Redwood Industries, Inc., was the employer of the 
defendant driver and owner of the vehicle driven at the time of the 
accident. Joe B. Turpin was the alleged intoxicated driver 
involved in the collision. 
The Complaint is curious because it states six causes of 
action against Rockwood Insurance Company and none against the 
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other two defendants. The general nature of the Complaint is that 
agents of the insurance company induced the plaintiff by fraud to 
enter a release and accept a payment for the death of his wife and 
his own personal injury. 
On February 12, 1988, Rockwood Insurance Company filed an 
Amended Third Party Complaint which joined as defendants Arizona 
All-Claims, Inc., d/b/a Utah All-Claims, Inc., and Ray Summers. 
These corporations were alleged to be the independent adjusting 
firm which actually handled the original settlement of the claim of 
the plaintiff for the death of his wife and his own injuries. Ray 
Summers was the employee of the adjusting firm that actually 
conducted the transaction. R., p. 212. 
Pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Rockwood Insurance 
Company, the Third District Court ordered the plaintiff elect to 
either affirm the release which had been entered or to pursue 
recision of the release on the basis of fraud and, if successful, 
pursue claims for wrongful death. R., pp. 333 - 340, 350, 354 -
356. The election to affirm the release was made by the plaintiff 
by formal notice on September 30, 1988. R., p. 547 - 548. 
The natural consequence of affirming the release was to allow 
the persons named in the release, Redwood Industries, Inc., and Joe 
B. Turpin be dismissed from the litigation pursuant to their Motion 
for Summary Judgment. R. , pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596. The result of 
these motions as of May 30, 1989, was that Rockwood Insurance 
Company was the only defendant left in the case with its third 
party claim against the adjusting agent still in place. 
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On December 18, 1989, the court granted leave for the 
plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, R. , p. 771. The amendment 
added the third party defendants as principal defendants under 
claims of bad faith insurance adjustment. R., pp. 927 - 939. 
On January 18, 1990, the court consolidated this case with 
cases C-87-2830 and C-86-985, described below. 
Without providing detail, a number of motions were filed by 
the defendant and resulted in some claims being dismissed against 
the insurer and the adjuster while others survived. In April 1990, 
the third party claims of Rockwood Insurance Company against the 
adjuster were dismissed. R., pp. 1479 - 1480. 
In a Motion filed May 17, 1990, plaintiff Stalboerger 
represented to the court that a settlement agreement had been 
reached with the Rockwood Insurance Company and Utah All-Claims and 
actually presented a copy of the release to the court for review. 
R. , pp. 1482 - 1491. This led to an Order of Dismissal in favor of 
Rockwood and the adjusting firm. R., pp. 1575 - 1579. 
The effect of the last Order described above of the court was 
to end the fraud case. 
C. Scurlock v. Turpin 
Case number C-86-0985 was filed February 10, 1986. This 
action, brought by a son of the decedent, was for wrongful death 
and named only the other driver in the accident, Joe Turpin, as a 
defendant. R. , p. 2. [All citations to the record in this section 
are to the paginated record of C-86-0985.] 
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An Amended Complaint was filed which expanded the plaintiffs 
to include Mark Scurlock and Mary Buerkle, the other surviving 
children of the decedent. The Amended Complaint named The Putter 
Club as a defendant. R., pp. 59 - 62. There is no order allowing 
the Amended Complaint. 
On July 1, 1988, the court entered an Order to Show Cause in 
which it acknowledged that the plaintiffs in this action had 
settled their claims. R., pp. 143 - 146, in Addendum "G". This 
key Order also stated that it realized plaintiff Stalboerger had to 
elect in a related case whether to proceed on his fraud claim by 
affirming the release or whether to seek recision of the release 
and move forward on the wrongful death claims. The court ordered 
that this case would be dismissed effective July 18, 1988, unless 
Stalboerger could show cause why the court should not dismiss the 
case with prejudice. 
In what can only be described as unusual at best, Stalboerger 
filed a Motion for Clarification of Previous Order over a year 
later on November 8, 1989. R., pp., 147 - 166. The procedure is 
unusual because Stalboerger was not a named party to the litigation 
yet was asking the court for specific rulings on the application of 
the litigation to him. While the resolution of this Motion was 
pending, the case was consolidated. An Order was entered on May 
10, 1990, which held that the Order of July 6, 1988, was not a 
final Order of Dismissal. R. , pp. 198 - 201. However, in a 
Memorandum, filed May 22, 1989, Stalboerger took the position that 
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the Order to Show Cause " . . . actually was an Order of Dismissal. 
. .". R., #C87-2830, p. 137. 
The procedural posture of this case defies rational descrip-
tion. All of the parties to the litigation had settled, the court 
had entered an Order stating the case would be dismissed as of a 
certain date and then stated that the lawsuit was not actually 
dismissed in response to a motion brought by someone who was not a 
party to the lawsuit. R., pp. 199 - 200. 
D. Stalboerger v. The Putter Club 
This case carried the district court number of C87-2830. 
[Citations to the record in this part are to C87-2830.] The 
complaint was originally filed on April 27, 1987. R., p. 2. 
Defendants were the driver, Joe Turpin, his employer, Redwood 
Industries, Inc., and The Putter Club. The Complaint generally 
claimed for the wrongful death of Marilyn Stalboerger with a claim 
of dram shop liability against The Putter Club. 
A review of the record shows that nothing of substance 
occurred and that the case essentially was dormant. Turpin did not 
appear through counsel until February 5, 1988. R. , p. 50. The 
first appearance of The Putter Club was in July, 1988. R., p. 67. 
As was shown in a motion much later, The Putter Club was never 
served by the plaintiff and the co-defendant, Joe Turpin, was 
actually the moving force behind getting The Putter Club into the 
litigation. R., p. 70 and R., C86-494, pp. 1736 - 1781. 
An Amended Complaint which added a claim for emotional 
distress was allowed on June 21, 1989. R., pp. 171 - 188. 
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Consolidation with the other cases described above was ordered on 
December 21, 1989. R. , pp. 252 - 253. 
Consolidation resulted in these cases being before the 
Honorable Michael Murphy under case number C86-494. Trial 
commenced in his court on September 17, 1991 and concluded with a 
jury verdict on September 20, 1991. R. C86-494, p. 1972. Judgment 
was entered on September 30, 1992 in the amount of $487,000 plus 
$100,000 of punitive damages. Because of some credits awarded by 
the court discussed in detail below, the net judgment was $551,900. 
R. C86-949, pp. 1974 - 1975. See, Addendum "Gfl. 
The Putter Club made a timely Motion for New Trial, or in the 
Alternative, for Remittitur on October 7, 1991. R. C86-494, p. 
1980. The Motion was denied on November 20, 1991. R. C86-494, p. 
2063. A Notice of Appeal was filed on December 16, 1991. R., pp. 
276 - 277. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of the citations to the record in this part are to case 
number C86-494 unless otherwise indicated. 
On June 20, 1985, at about 350 South on Redwood Road in Salt 
Lake City, John and Marilyn Stalboerger were riding in one vehicle 
and Joe Turpin was driving another vehicle. R. , p. la. Turpin, 
who was later determined to be intoxicated, crossed the center 
median to collide with the Stalboergers. Mrs. Stalboerger was 
killed in the collision. 
While vigorously contested at trial, plaintiff successfully 
had a jury conclude that Mr. Turpin had become intoxicated while 
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consuming alcohol at The Putter Club, a private club located at the 
time in Salt Lake City. See Amended Complaint, generally, in C87-
2830, at R., p. 177, et seq. 
Turpin was operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer, 
Redwood Industries. R., p. 2. It was later determined that both 
Turpin and the Stalboergers were insured by the same insurance 
company, Rockwood Insurance Company. R., p. 2. 
A few days after the accident, plaintiff was contacted by Ray 
Summers, an insurance adjuster employed by Utah All-Claims, Inc., 
in behalf of Rockwood Insurance Company. R. , p. 2. On July 12, 
1985, plaintiff Stalboerger accepted $48,000 in full settlement of 
the claims he had for his own injuries and for the death of his 
wife. R. , p. 22. It is this release that Mr. Stalboerger later 
claimed was induced by fraud. R., pp. 3 - 10. 
The foregoing constitutes an overview of the facts which 
formed the core of the claims in the case. Details are established 
by reference to the record in connection with the arguments made 
herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Putter Club shows herein that this case should never have 
gone to trial. The primary reason is that the plaintiff, John 
Stalboerger, had signed a general release which, despite his claims 
had been induced by fraud, he later affirmed in writing in the 
litigation. The Putter Club claims that the release should be 
interpreted to mean what it says and what it says is that anybody 
that caused him legal injury is released. 
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The Putter Club next shows this court that the damages claimed 
in the fraud action were the loss of Stalboerger's wrongful death 
claim through fraud. When Stalboerger settled the fraud action, he 
also settled the wrongful death claim in the related lawsuit by 
operation of law. The district court should have found that there 
were no damages left to award in the wrongful death action after 
the fraud settlement. At a minimum, the district court should have 
given a full credit for damages received in the fraud case against 
the damages awarded in the wrongful death action because such 
damages represent the same loss. 
The Putter Club further shows that Stalboerger's election of 
remedies to affirm the release and pursue his fraud remedies 
constitutes a waiver of the wrongful death claim which the district 
court should have dismissed. 
Yet another reason this case should not have gone to trial is 
that the court should have applied Utah's One Action Rule for 
wrongful death cases. Specifically, the first wrongful death 
action filed by the children of the deceased was in a representa-
tive capacity of all heirs, including Mr. Stalboerger. When that 
case was settled, Stalboerger's claim was also settled and 
Stalboerger should look to the other heirs of the deceased for his 
share of the settlement. 
Should this court determine that the district court correctly 
allowed the case to move to trial, it is apparent that error was 
made in allowing punitive damages. The Dram Shop Act in effect at 
11 
the time specifically defined what damages were available under the 
Act, Punitive damages are not an element of damage allowed. 
Even if punitive damages were legally available, this is a 
classic case of insufficient evidence to support the award. The 
Putter Club had net assets of $6,000 yet a grossly disproportionate 
punitive damage award of $100,000 was allowed. This is contrary to 
Utah case law setting the legal standard for the award of punitive 
damages. 
Substantial error also occurred when the district court 
refused to allow The Putter Club to tell the jury that other 
settlements had been made with the plaintiff and other heirs. 
Utah's One Action Rule provides that there is one measure of 
damages for the loss of a person and the failure to tell the jury 
about the other settlements had the effect of distorting the jury 
deliberation. 
Finally, the district court erred in refusing to grant a 
Motion for Mistrial when it allowed remarks of plaintiff's counsel 
in closing argument to stand wherein he argued that the jury should 
send a message to bar owners in Utah. This argument appeals to 
passion and prejudice and, under case law, was clearly improper. 
PLEASE NOTE THAT ALL REFERENCES TO THE RECORD IN THIS BRIEF 
ARE TO CASE NUMBER C86-494 UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF RELEASED THE PUTTER CLUB 
A. Applicable Facts 
As recited above, on July 12, 1985, plaintiff Stalboerger 
executed a "Release of All Claims". See Addendum "E". This 
release, in pertinent part, provided: 
. . . Andrew John Stalboerger individually and 
as heir of Marilyn Stalboerger do/does hereby 
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, adminis-
trators, successors and assigns release, 
acquit and forever discharge Joseph Turpin, 
individually, and Redwood Industries, Inc., of 
Salt Lake and his, her, their, or its agents, 
servants, successors, heirs, executors, admin-
istrators and all other persons, firms, corpo-
rations, associations or partnerships of and 
from any and all claims, actions, causes of 
action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss 
of services, expenses and compensation whatso-
ever, which the undersigned now has . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
This release is the subject of the original fraud lawsuit in which 
plaintiff claimed he was fraudulently induced by insurance company 
representatives to execute the release. The district court later 
required the plaintiff to elect whether he would proceed to collect 
damages from the insurer for the fraud or whether he would seek 
recision of the release and move forward on the wrongful death 
claim. R. , pp. 354 - 357. The plaintiff elected to proceed on the 
fraud claim. R., pp. 511 - 513. As a consequence of that 
election, other defendants in the fraud case that might have been 
liable only for wrongful death were immediately dismissed out of 
the lawsuit. R., pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596. 
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B. Issue Presented 
The Putter Club pled in its Answer that the release signed by 
Stalboerger containing the general language also released The 
Putter Club. R. , C87-2830, p. 80. The issue was formally present-
ed to the court by a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by The 
Putter Club. R., pp. 1528, et seg. The district court ruled that 
The Putter Club was not released under the general language of the 
release. R., p. 1572 - 1574. 
The issue presented here is whether a general release is 
enforceable by parties generally described in a release. 
C. Analysis 
At common law, the release of one joint tort-feasor acted to 
release all other joint tort-feasors. Utah adopted the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, found in §78-27-42, to 
ameliorate this common law rule. Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 
1349 (Utah 1986). 
The statute in effect at the time Stalboerger executed the 
release read as follows: 
78-27-42. A release by the injured person of 
one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after 
judgment, does not discharge the other tort-
feasors, unless the release so provides, but 
reduces the claim against the other tort-
feasors by the greater of: (1) The amount of 
the consideration paid for that release; or 
(2) the amount or proportion by which the 
release provides that the total claim shall be 
reduced. (Emphasis added) 
Unfortunately, while the Uniform Act has received wide 
acceptance by a majority of the states, the language "unless the 
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release so provides" has been subject to three approaches of 
interpretation. As explained in Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R.f 773 
S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1989), the three approaches are generally labeled 
as the "flat bar" rule, the "intent" rule, and the "specific 
identity" rule. 
Briefly, the flat bar rule is that the release does what it 
says. That is, when a release purports to release "all" it means 
"all". Our own federal Tenth Circuit has adopted this approach as 
has our neighboring state of New Mexico. See, Mussett v. Baker 
Material Handling Corp.f 844 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. 
City of Las Cruces. 521 P.2d 1037 (N.M. App. 1974). 
Under the intent rule, some courts have taken the approach 
that the broad language of a general release is applicable to 
unnamed tort-feasors only if evidence is presented that the parties 
to the release so intended. 
The specific identity rule interprets the statutory language 
to mean that the release of one tort-feasor does not discharge 
others unless they are specifically named in the release or 
otherwise specifically identifiable from the face of the release. 
A review of the case law will show that this is the minority 
approach with a likely plurality of the flat bar rule among the 
jurisdictions considering the question. 
With Stalboerger having affirmed the release so that he could 
move forward against the insurance company on his fraud claim, the 
issue for this court of first impression is whether the general 
release executed includes in its broad language The Putter Club. 
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An examination of the law and facts shows that this state ought to 
adopt the flat bar rule. In fact, as shown below, it appears that 
Utah has essentially adopted the rule already. 
First, rules of statutory interpretation dictate application 
of the release to The Putter Club. Courts are to assume that each 
term in a statute was used advisedly and that the statutory 
language should be read literally unless the language is unrea-
sonably confused or inoperable. Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Cox Rock Prod, v. Walker 
Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988). Statutes are not 
to be construed as effecting change in the common law beyond that 
which is clearly indicated keeping in mind the remedial application 
intended. Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244 (Utah App. 1987). 
If one looks at the language of §78-27-42 in light of these 
rules of statutory construction, what emerges is that the legis-
lature intended to reverse the common law rule that the release of 
one joint tort-feasor automatically releases all others, but 
allowed releasors to release other tort-feasors. Construction 
towards finding intent or specificity under the other approaches is 
inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction because those 
approaches go further than the literal language of the statute 
which is not confused or unreasonable on its face. 
A second reason that the literal language of the release 
applies to The Putter Club is that the construction proposed is 
consistent with the rules of contract interpretation. A release is 
a contract subject to the same general rules of interpretation as 
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other contracts. Horgan v. Indus. Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 
1982). A contract in Utah is given the meaning which its ordinary 
language suggests determined by reading the contract in its 
entirety and giving effect to all parts so far as that is possible. 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357 
(Utah App. 1987). Utah law further holds that it is not the role 
of courts in contractual disputes to relieve a party of an 
improvident or bad bargain if the language is sufficiently clear, 
including language of releases. Horgan, id. 
The release at issue does not contain technical or vague 
language. The plain language of this release is that it releases 
"all". This plain language was affirmed by the plaintiff and 
explains why, in the fraud case, the other defendants who had no 
role in the fraud but were potential wrongful death defendants 
(Turpin and his employer, Redwood Industries) were released by the 
court from the lawsuit. With the release affirmed, there was no 
longer a wrongful death claim against them. All means all. That 
it may have been a bad bargain in hindsight is not the standard for 
interpreting the release. Plaintiff obviously had legal counsel at 
the time the release language was affirmed and is without legal 
justification to avoid the rules of construction of the release. 
Yet another reason for adopting a flat bar rule is that Utah 
case law has, essentially, already adopted the rule through at 
least one case decided by this court. In Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 
128 (Utah App. 1991), an injured party executed a release which 
released a tort-feasor and employees of the tort-feasor. The 
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injured party then sought to bring an action against an employee of 
the released party for the same injury. This court held that use 
of the term "employee" was sufficient to release the defendant 
employee. This court correctly applied the rules of construction 
discussed above to apply the plain language of the release and hold 
that the language releasing persons falling within the word 
"employee" does just that. 
Similarly, The Putter Club falls within the general language 
of "all other persons, firms, and corporations which might have 
contributed" to the claims made by the plaintiff. One reading the 
release has no more difficulty in understanding the Stalboerger 
release than the release signed by Palmer referring to employees. 
In addition to the reasons given above to enforce the release, 
there are some public policy reasons for applying the release to 
The Putter Club. One is that a defendant entering a release has no 
certainty of being absolved from liability if the plaintiff cannot 
generally release all potential tort-feasors. As in the Palmer 
case and as in the three cases which were at issue here, plaintiff 
may fragment litigation with scattered lawsuits raising the spectre 
of indemnification and of contribution claims against the released 
tort-feasors. Defendants need to know that they are out of risk of 
further liability or a chill is put on the settlement process. 
See, Morison v. General Motors Corp. , 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1970). 
This court should apply the plain language of the affirmed 
release and reverse the trial court by vacating the judgment 
because The Putter Club was released. 
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II. STALBOERGER WAIVED HIS CLAIM AGAINST 
THE PUTTER CLUB BY HIS ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
A. Applicable Facts 
By Order, dated July 6, 1988, the court ordered the plaintiff 
in the fraud case to elect whether he would affirm the release and 
move forward with the fraud claim or whether he would seek recision 
of the release and move forward with the wrongful death claims. 
R., p. 354. See, Addendum "H". Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Election on September 30, 1988, in which he indicated he was 
affirming that he would proceed with the fraud claim. R., p. 511. 
See, Addendum "I". The natural byproduct of affirming the release 
was to let those against whom a wrongful death claim, but not a 
fraud claim, was asserted out of the lawsuit. Joe Turpin, and his 
employer, Redwood Industries, Inc., were dismissed as defendants. 
R., pp. 585 - 586, 594 - 596. 
The Putter Club, recognizing that it was included in the 
encompassing language of the release also sought dismissal because 
of the election of remedies. R. , p. 1535. The court denied the 
Motion without explanation. R., pp. 1572 and 1580. 
B. Issue Presented 
At issue is whether Stalboerger waived his wrongful death 
claim against The Putter Club by affirming the release of July 15, 
1985. 
C. Analysis 
This Brief established earlier that a release is a contract 
subject to the rules generally governing contracts. A fundamental 
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principle of contract law is that one defrauded in the inducement 
to enter the contract has three remedies. The injured party may 
either affirm the transaction and seek damages for the fraud, may 
rescind the fraudulent transaction, or may seek enforcement of the 
actual deal made. 12 Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts 
§1523 (3rd ed.). This election must be made within a reasonable 
time after discovery of the fraud. Williston, §1523. 
Another basic principle of contract law is that after 
affirmation of the transaction with knowledge of the fraud the 
injured party loses the power to avoid the contract. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts §380. 
Utah has long followed this rule of election. In Viallet v. 
Consolidated Ry. and Power Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 P. 496 (1906), the 
court considered a similar case in which an injured party sought to 
avoid a release which he claimed was induced by misrepresentation. 
The court freely recognized that the plaintiff could avoid a 
release and proceed to recover for the insufficient settlement 
entered by the fraudulent inducement. 
In Midvale Motorsf Inc. v. Saunders, 19 Utah 2d. 403, 432 P.2d 
37 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a real estate 
vendor could pursue alternative inconsistent remedies. The court 
held that the defendants had a right during the course of litiga-
tion to demand the vendor make an election between the inconsistent 
remedies sought. The requirement to make an election in fraud 
cases has been clearly stated in Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 
(Utah 1979). See, also, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
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The Utah rule was clearly stated in Cook v. Covey-Ballard 
Motor Co. . 69 Utah 161, 253 P. 196 (1927). There a buyer sought to 
recover damages incurred because of fraud in the sale of an 
automobile. The court made clear that the buyer can affirm the 
contract and sue for damages or can seek to rescind the contract 
and seek other damages. The two positions are, however, inconsis-
tent and an election is required. 
Other states have recognized that an injured party must elect 
between fraud remedies when fraudulently induced to enter a 
release. For example in Mackley v. Allstate Ins. Co.P 564 S.W.2d 
634 (Mo. App. 1978), the court held that an injured party must 
elect to proceed either on the personal injury claim or affirm the 
release and proceed on fraud. Cf, Richardson v. Economy Fire & 
Casualty Co., 485 N.E.2d 327 (111. 1985). 
Put in the context of this case, what happened conceptually is 
that Stalboerger sued Rockwood Insurance claiming that the 
misrepresentations of its agents caused him to accept less than the 
full value of his claim and generally loose his wrongful death 
claims. Stalboerger was, in effect, telling the court that he had 
been defrauded by Rockwood of The Putter Club claim by entering the 
release. By electing to affirm the release, Stalboerger was 
seeking to recover from Rockwood Insurance Company the value of 
that which he lost and had waived the alternative remedy of moving 
forward on the wrongful death claims. The Third District Court 
erred by letting him have both approaches. That is, Stalboerger 
affirmed the release that releases all claims, Stalboerger 
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collected $168,000 in settlement, and then was allowed to recover 
from The Putter Club that which he had claimed he lost and settled 
in the fraud case. This approach is clearly wrong, grants a double 
recovery, and ignores the fundamental law of election of remedies 
in fraud cases. 
This court should hold that the wrongful death claim against 
The Putter Club was waived by the election of remedies in which 
Stalboerger ratified the release and reverse the judgment of the 
trial court. 
III. SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAMAGES AWARDED SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ELIMINATED OR SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED BY AN APPROPRIATE OFFSET 
A. Applicable Facts 
Plaintiff's original lawsuit was Stalboerger v. Rockwood Ins. 
Co. , et al. , Case No. C86-494. As explained earlier in this Brief, 
the Complaint was amended and ultimately ended up with the insurer 
of the tort-feasor, insurance adjusting firms, and an insurance 
adjuster as defendants. Put at its most basic, Stalboerger claimed 
that he was fraudulently induced to enter the release of July 12, 
1985 by agents of Rockwood Insurance Company. 
A reading of the Complaint shows that the plaintiff correctly 
understood that the measure of damages for his Complaint was the 
loss of his claim for the wrongful death of his wife in executing 
the release. This approach is consistent with the earlier original 
and subsequent Amended Complaints. R. , pp. 927 - 939. See, 
Addendum "J". For example, allegation number 19 of the operative 
Amended Complaint states: 
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19* Plaintiff is entitled to recover from 
Rockwood an amount equaling the full value of 
his claims arising from the aforesaid automo-
bile accident based on the facts known at the 
time of the purported settlement. Plaintiff 
is also entitled to recover interest [and 
other damages]. 
Q T T ^ i -»-V^ , Plaint i f f :: omp 1 a i i it s 
.lowing: 
21. Prior wo plaintiff's signing I,I cne 
purported release, defendants repre-
sented to plaintiff that the amount of the 
purported settlement represented the fair 
value of plaintiff's cl aims. 
Again - -. allegata on number 
24. . . . [Plaintiff] has been unable to 
realize the fair value of his claims and/or 
the amounts Rockwood was prepared to pay 
A further reading of thn romp I H i nl II 11 l pun ( i n< i i IUHMNI J5 
I i ilii»* MM IM' pldintiti states hit. claim was worth $8(30,000 
but lie was tricked into accepting a mere $48,000. 
Also significant is thf pi iiyoi im icliol iiiiiiiii Il .it !«>'" , p 'Mil. 
r I ' h e r *• • I. h i • i I a 1111 ill prays i o x judgment: 
1, I n an amount representing the full value 
of his claims for the death of his wife and 
his own personal injuries, and/or the amount 
plaintiff could have realized from such 
claims. 
Plaintiff filed % P<JJ ticularized Statement • * Allega-
tions found fci -ecord tatement 
show, MIHI . . . , *u. claiming that r.t< was tricked by an 
insurance adjuster into giving up value i v'air 
the wrongful death of I .„: 
Addendum ' " 1 : ' 
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The gate to reversible error was opened when plaintiff was 
allowed by the district court to act inconsistent conceptually with 
what he claimed. Specifically, plaintiff filed in the fraud case 
a Motion for Approval of Settlement. R. , p. 1482. This Motion had 
attached to it a settlement agreement to resolve the case with the 
fraud defendants. The Settlement Agreement is reproduced in 
Addendum "L". This document completely ignored the claims made and 
was phrased in a self-serving manner which, unfortunately, was 
affirmed by the district court. See, Addendum "M". 
An examination of the settlement agreement, at R. , p. 1486, 
shows that the parties stipulated that the $48,000 settlement paid 
at the time of the original release was to be allocated $32,100 for 
the wrongful death claim, $15,000 for Stalboerger's personal injury 
claims, and $900 for property damage. Stalboerger obviously 
realized that in affirming the release he released The Putter Club. 
A self-serving paragraph was inserted whereby it was stated that 
there was no intent to release other parties and the Agreement went 
on to try and show the settlement of a fraud claim was not for the 
damages alleged in the claim. Finally, the Rockwood and Summers 
agreed to pay another $120,000 to Stalboerger under mutual 
agreement that this was not payment for the fraud claims. The 
fraud claim was, however, dismissed by the court pursuant to this 
Motion. R. , p. 1576. The court also struck the defense of The 
Putter Club that it was released by the July 12, 1985 release. 
The Putter Club responded to this gross distortion of the 
legal concepts at work in the litigation by filing a Motion for 
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Summary Judgment asking i :. i set-off of the settlement but was 
unsuccessful. K 
issue presented for analysis is whether the district court 
erred r. allowing the plaintiff t« proceen fraud theory I i i 11 
for a* least in
 l
,
^ i t i i » damages was the 
amounl, lust, by sett i m y iui ar inadequate amount because of the 
fraud, and then claii 1 settlement agreement that the in1 iff 
r e c • til ii ] i ig 01 1 1 i i s fr a/i mi - - c r e d i t 
was due The Putter Club. 
Analysis 
Stalboerger started out right conceptual ' y rind ernlH"1 | i^ '.-ng 
bpi^niK^ I i i^rrvu'iu i| AM stated b) UM» various Complaints filed 
by -.*- plaintitf , the measure of damages in the fraud case is what 
the plainti!• iov5 because 4 
Jin " 11 1'L'aud and Deceiv s , .. . -u, b , . 
Uta; infortunatel v * specific cnse <• Mea-
surement damages when i , i n g 
ii'Kliiii veil il.i'i release im personal j_n mry claims ther 
states have considered the question and determined that the proper 
measure of damages would ; ,. he 
I I I I i i -« .. For example n Montoya v. 
Moore, 42 2 P, >!d 3 6 1 (N.M . -• * injured party brought a lawsuit 
against an insurance oomnr i\ • i m i I .11 a i i eyatiuns made 
t case, ; * . , Mexico court recognized that the 
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plaintiff may elect one of several remedies to proceed. Again, as 
in this case, the plaintiff ratified the release and proceeded with 
his action in fraud. The court found that the correct measure of 
damages is that which places the injured party in the same position 
that he would have occupied had he not been defrauded. 
In Richardson v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.
 r 485 N.E.2d 327 
(111. 1985), the court considered the claim of an injured party in 
a motorcycle accident against an insurance company for allegedly 
being induced to sign a release for less than the full value of the 
claim. The court noted the importance of the plaintiff affirming 
the release and held that the proper measure of damages is the 
difference between what the plaintiff received under the release 
and the "probable amount" that would have been received absent a 
fraud. 
Though Utah has no recent case law concerning fraud with 
respect to a personal injury case, the conclusion of the courts 
identified above is consistent with Utah case law. That is, the 
correct measure of damage in a fraud case is the actual amount of 
the loss caused by the fraud, plus other damages which naturally 
flow from the fraudulent activity. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1980). Cf. , Viallet v. Consolidated Ry. and Power Co., 30 
Utah 260, 84 P. 496 (1906). 
In this case, assuming that fraud occurred, what Stalboerger 
lost was the difference between what he might have received in 
settlement absent fraud and what he actually received. Conse-
quently, when he settled the fraud case for $120,000, his settle-
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ment was a settlement o* uic i rajd claim notwithstanding the labels 
• **- attempted * j»-»">• • 111 1 I >« i ui e , 
<t. dismissal o* *-. fraud claim. 
This argument is consistent with *J -*- ? ^/ discusser •. • length 
earlier » -• • • . _
 ie 
, , ,. >> rfihi i i >dv , V/^-2 provides that 
when a tort-feasor is released, the claim against •• other tnrh-
feasors i s i n« |m• *M i 1.\ i i 11 r < •. * t < • • > 11||» >i• i' « ~ i e c o n s i d e r -
ati.on paid lor the release or the a m o u m jn proportion _. *\i -h the 
release provides that the total claim shall be reduced 
Addendum • i'»" . • .; . *_•. than the release' s 
attempt reduce the claim by onl> $ : H , C 0 ; , §78-27-42 dictates 
credi /)! The Putter Club. 
I ! ,'niti",11, have it both ways, He cannot 
Cjaiiii Liidt .he release is 1 effective and then ignore the credit 
dictatec ; statute. Conversely- il 111 i: e] ease 1;1. el feet 1 1 , lie 
x\ „ „ 1 "'i' VI!Ji ' l" received earlier. 
\ rurd reason supports the proposition that not only 
should a credit he rendered, but ' I 
c ' * « -:*:' l»" "i " 1 i "I'll IU-H P.,J,I.LV v ;,y iu- settlement ihis 
is because the application of the One-Action Rule, discussed in 
considerab1 - ,i«-tail 1 a t e 1 * 1 11 t h i n Brief 1 
Kill* , lli'f- ;J it i 1 1 nisi-' c11 jctiofi i»»r wrongful death 
An illustration demonstrates why The Putter Club conceptually owes 
nothing because of the fraud sett] em<- -1 
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For example, assume that a wrongful death has occurred. 
Assume further that the value of the wrongful death is $100,000. 
"A" and "B" are the sole heirs of the deceased. As explained in 
detail hereinafter, there is one claim for the wrongful death of 
the decedent. If the value of the wrongful death is apportioned 
according to Utah's laws of intestacy, "A" and "B" should each 
receive $50,000. However, if "A" settled for $1,000 for reasons of 
his own, "B" is not automatically entitled to $99,000. Rather, "B" 
would receive $50,000 and the defendants would receive a credit for 
$49,000. To hold otherwise would guarantee that a wrongful death 
defendant would never settle with an heir. Liability exposure 
would not be reduced by settlement unless all heirs settled at 
once. 
Stalboerger falls squarely within the illustration above. 
Stalboerger claims that he was defrauded of the full value of the 
claim for the wrongful death of his wife. Because the One-Action 
Rule sets a single measure of damages for the deceased, Stalboerger 
had some percentage of the total measure of damages which he lost. 
When he settled his fraud claim, the amount of money he received is 
the least amount which would be applied as a credit. The actual 
credit is the full value of the settled claim against the full 
value of the wrongful death. That is, when he settled the fraud 
claim, he settled by implication his damages under the wrongful 
death claim. 
For Stalboerger to prevail, this court must create new law 
explaining away the One-Action Rule and explaining away the 
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inconsistent positions of suing for loss (if the wrongful death 
claim in the fraud case rimi 1 ISNCFI in i i In wi in death claim 
tuti: case The One-Action Rule dictates that the wrongful 
death claim was forever settled when he elected to pursue his I i ami 
remedy. Otherw i »•.e ,„ ' In 111' • Ar I i on U111< • \uv 11«> meaning a111J, i 11 
I act, ~/$e vprv vvi^o , multiple. 1 awsuits leading to confusing 
results tc;i which tit* one-Action Rule was adopter1 
HI , * " release is 
enforceable should hold that n Stalboerger settled his full 
wrongful death olai- •?• , minimum, The Put t.f-1 « h h In 111 ho 
I I -M I fS I , I • 1 1 I .. 
I V . THE « " A • i in fii H|i| !! SHOULD HAVE BARRED T H I S ACTION 
A. Applicable Facts 
O n F e b r u a r y • i M II I »I I ill, i 1 e«;eased 
I .4,1 *ii.:. ; • ; wrongful death numbered 
C86-0985 :86-0985, p| • « cour* * ! case 
recognized that there wa? a r o i I iboerger 
a . IIM. ^w,.4j denying a Motion to Dismiss 
of I..he defendant «- .',oi: i . * v. - - * ^ourlock wrongful 
death case would be consolidat i .ei case provided 
thai Lime reJec - - * - ...vai. • :86-0985, pp. .^ -
43. 
Mr Scurlock later oskod Hi" i HII I h i IIMV, I. I I IP an 
f\ p i c i HI ii•11 i , brothei a na sister as 
plaintiffs, identified himself as acting for estate cf M.: 
Stalboerger, and namer L,^^. defendant. 
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R. , C86-0985, pp. 57 - 62. This move is significant because in the 
supporting Memorandum, Scurlock explained to the court that he 
realized he was acting for all heirs of Marilyn Stalboerger. R., 
C86-0985, at p. 64. 
The children of Marilyn Stalboerger later entered a release of 
All Claims specifically identifying The Putter Club. These 
releases are found in the record to C86-494 at pp. 384 - 391 and 
are reproduced in the Addendum. 
The district court, obviously recognizing the issues created 
by the one-action rule, then issued an Order to Show Cause to all 
other heirs as to why the case should not be dismissed because of 
the settlement of the children. The Certificate of Service shows 
the Order was mailed to counsel for Mr. Stalboerger. R. , C86-0985, 
pp. 143 - 145. Stalboerger never responded to the Order to Show 
Cause and the case was, as explained earlier in this Brief, sort of 
dismissed and sort of left open. 
B. Nature of Wrongful Death Actions in Utah 
The error of the district court in this case apparently arises 
from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a wrongful 
death action in Utah. The obvious beginning analysis is §78-11-7 
of the Utah Code. The intent of this section is to overcome old 
common law rules blocking recovery for death and create a cause of 
action in the surviving heirs. Webb v. Denver & R.G.W.Ry.. 7 Utah 
17, 24 P. 616 (1890). This statute makes clear that the personal 
representative or any heir may bring the action for wrongful death 
for the benefit of all heirs. 
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The intended operation of V/8-11-' is explained 
cases in Utah, The firr;l, In Re Behind Estate. 11/ HI 
i ii [ i )f explained that the legislature intended t create 
one cause of action which may be brought by the heirs H IP 
persona] represental i • ' I i "'vras1 'I ft» "In- l»enc: . JJJ 
heirs need be named d plaintiffs. 
H second case, Switzer v. Reynolds, 
1980' ->. • .; wrongful death 
statute i , , i J - • • again explained that there is but one 
• .<im against « -. -feaso- *^ - damages and tihp *s 
forwa; * -* nne action M» court 
expressed the policy that a "wrong-doer" should not be compelled to 
respond t* multiple claims for damages • ^ 
c r i s e s i'i* i II I i.»:i" \ . * * & ihai there i s one 
actio* iesolving wrongful death cases Catmull v. Medical 
Integrated Sys. . Inc. , 517 P. 2d 1023 (Ui .al i J 974 ) , 1 J ic : • i. i I 1 u s ] < 1 
1 i * i * i i u i ii i i e Lease against one tort-feasor that the 
parents the deceased had released other potential defendants. 
There -- as the court explained, nil , « . dim ;P n( i 1 .i! lowed 
i in I <ili M I hi ui i I .ill I c l a i m s s h o u l d b e r e s o l v e d in I hat o n e 
actJ on. 
In Ouinn v . Ouinn f 77? it\ "id «i/n iiifali AJHII M W I , I I -OHM 
c'.>"«..• i iinrml i •• MJ*J,1: LUI luumli i ig whether a p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e had 
g i v e n adequate n o t i c e t o pursue an act*or ' o r wrongful death T 
e s t a t e of t t ip t o r t - f e a s o r 
casi in IIir. in in r e s t a t e d t h e p o s i t i o n taken in t h i s Drief t h a t 
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there is under Utah law only a single wrongful death action which 
can be brought either by the personal representative or by an heir, 
but not both because one or the other acts for all heirs. 
The operation of the one action rule is, unfortunately, not 
widely addressed in case law. There are some cases from other 
states which follow analysis consistent with that stated herein. 
For example, in Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Found. Health Planr Inc., 71 
Cal. App. 3d 803, 138 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1977), the court considered 
a dispute between parents of a deceased seeking to bring a wrongful 
death action after the decedent's husband and son had settled a 
prior suit brought for the same wrongful death. All of these 
persons were heirs under California's wrongful death statute. The 
court held the statute contemplated only one action for wrongful 
death. The parents, the court said, had an equal right to bring an 
action and had a responsibility to join their action with knowledge 
that the other heirs had filed suit. The claim of the parents was, 
consequently, barred. 
The same result was obtained in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 655 P. 2d 
748 (Alaska 1982). It was held there that a release executed by a 
personal representative pursuant to a wrongful death action barred 
the subsequent claim by a son of the deceased under a statute that 
anticipated one action being brought for all of the heirs. The 
personal representative in that case admittedly entered the release 
under the understanding that it would not be binding on the son, 
but the court held that the mistaken belief was not relevant under 
an one action rule. 
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C Analysis 
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, ,v ^ .
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plaintiffs -ijonq *«- the 
recitation therein that Paul Scurlock was acting for the estate of 
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to the record, Stalboerger, for reasons not in the record, chose 
not to pursue his wrongful death claim in the Scurlock case. One 
can surmise with almost certain accuracy that the reason was that 
he always intended to pursue the fraud claim and elect to recover 
for his losses in fraud rather than in a wrongful death action. 
This is reinforced by Stalboerger's disinterest in serving The 
Putter Club with the Complaint as explained earlier. 
Under the case law stated above, when the Scurlocks executed 
the release, The Putter Club was released for all heirs. The 
failure of Stalboerger to protect his rights under the one action 
rule is an apparent tactical choice to which he should be held. 
The requirement that The Putter Club face a series of lawsuits by 
multiple heirs is exactly the problem which the one action rule was 
adopted to prevent. To hold otherwise would be to create judicial-
ly a requirement that potential defendants in wrongful death cases 
conduct genealogical research to make sure all of the heirs have 
been located and are satisfied with the settlement even though the 
wrongful death statute says that the plaintiff with whom the 
defendant is negotiating acts for all heirs. 
The Putter Club raised the one action rule problem in a timely 
Motion for Summary Judgment in case no. C87-2830. R. , C87-2830, 
pp. Ill - 122. The court denied the Motion. R. , C87-2830, pp. 252 
- 254. The Putter Club raised the issue again after consolidation 
of the cases. R. , pp. 1528 - 1565. The failure of the district 
court to apply the one action rule was error. This court should 
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reverse the district court judgment ». x s entirety by holding that 
a trial should have nevei ' i i r si; place. 
V THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN' ALLOWING 
THE JURY TO CONSIDER PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The district court allowed cu iri :; damages ^ be considered 
1 i in t;wi,) phases. eturne< • u&^i -+ 1 iabi 1 ity and 
compensate ,Jiberation 
against The Putter Club and then were ai owed to receive and 
consider evidence concerning punitive damages before -*t i nq 
ncerning pu* * * damages, 
iuiy awarded $100,000. 
Timely objection was made 5 y Liie defendant ^ s n 
I - noncerning punitive damages. , 
pp. 3431 ^d J J zing that the court; had erred, The Putter 
Club made a Motion for Remittitin »H I in \\\ I i" -t 
1- .Mini • , INK, The nstriil court 
denied the Motion and the punitive damage award was allowed to 
stand. R., p. 2063. 
Legal Backgroun* 
Ai > exp i Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P. 2d /-*--- * 
Utah's Dram Shop Act altered Uu common law r« e thnt there * *<-- - > 
cause i-r action against purveyoi * * • 
See, <• - Lewis v. Wolt . 596 a * * , w- |An^. App. I'* '<•> 
A reading of Reeves shows that analysis * 4 -irnK *=*,*». ictions, 
because they are creatures „ 
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language of the dram shop statute. Put another way, the scope of 
the cause of action is determined by reading carefully the Dram 
Shop Act. This approach was followed in Brinkerhoff v. Forsythf 
779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989). There at issue was the scope of an 
exemption for bartenders employed by the State of Utah. The Utah 
Supreme Court again followed the literal language of the Dram Shop 
Act in order to determine the scope of its application. See, also, 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134
 f 763 P.2d 806, (Utah 1988). 
The Dram Shop Act at issue in this litigation has been amended 
since this accident occurred. The damages provided in the act in 
effect at the time of the accident provides that those who sell 
intoxicating liquor to others are " . . . liable for injuries in 
person, property, or means of support. . .". See, §37-11-1 in 
Addendum. 
C. Analysis 
In Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987), this court 
held that punitive damages were available against drunk drivers 
under appropriate circumstances. A review of the Utah case law 
shows, however, that there has not been a determination of whether 
punitive damages may be applied to a dram shop under the Dram Shop 
Act. 
If one applies the law described above to the effect that dram 
shop actions are a creature of statute and that one derives rights 
from the plain language of the statute, it is seen that punitive 
damages are not available in Utah for dram shop actions. The most 
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to apply its plain 
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the jury. First, the policy of the state is to construe away from 
punitive damages. Second, the cause of action arising under the 
Dram Shop Act is limited by the actual language of the Act because 
dram shop actions are a creature of statute. Finally, a reading of 
§37-11-1 shows that only injuries to the person, property, and for 
loss of support are available under the plain language of the 
statute. This court should reverse the trial court and vacate the 
award of punitive damages. 
VI. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
BOTH THE AWARD AND THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. Applicable Facts 
Objection was made by The Putter Club to consideration by the 
jury of an award of punitive damages. R., pp. 3433 - 3435. After 
trial, objection was made again in the form of a Motion for New 
Trial or, in the Alternative, for Remittitur of the punitive damage 
amounts. R., p. 1991. The jury was allowed by the district court 
to consider punitive damages and awarded $100,000. 
B. Applicable Law 
If this court should hold that punitive damages were legally 
available in spite of the argument raised in the foregoing section, 
the next relevant question becomes whether under the allowable 
standards the damages were available in this case and, if so, 
whether the amount awarded was within the amounts allowed by law. 
In claiming insufficient evidence, appellant has the duty to 
marshal1 all of the facts in support of the verdict and show this 
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court why those facts are insufficient. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 
744 (Utah App. 1991) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P. 2d 771 
(Utah 1988), provided that punitive damages may be imposed for 
conduct that is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of 
others. Citing with approval Biswell, supra, the court agreed that 
punitive damages are intended to address wrongful acts which are 
above and beyond the basic elements of the cause of action. As 
explained in Biswell, the mere fact that one is a drunken driver 
that causes injury is not sufficient to impose punitive damages. 
Instead, the trier of fact must find some aggravating circumstances 
arising above the basic elements of the cause of action. 
Johnson was primarily concerned with assessing liability 
against the employer of a drunk driver. The standard for reaching 
the employer for the acts of the employee were discussed exhaust-
ively. The Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §909 and the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §217C. The elements which the court set out were as 
follows: 
1. The employer authorized the doing and 
manner of the act. 
2. The agent was unfit and the owner was 
reckless in employing him. 
3. The agent was employed in a managerial 
capacity and was acting in the scope of 
employment. 
4. The employer ratified or approved the 
act. 
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The holding of Johnson was that if at least one of these 
factors are not present, punitive damages cannot be assessed 
against the employer• 
The other major body of law for consideration is factors to be 
considered by a jury in justifying the amount of punitive damages. 
Utah has identified the following factors for consideration by the 
jury: 
1. The relative wealth of the defendant. 
2. The nature of the alleged misconduct. 
3. The facts and circumstances of the mis-
conduct and the effect upon the lives of 
the plaintiff. 
4. The probability of future recurrences of 
the misconduct. 
5. The relationship between the parties. 
6. The amount of actual damages awarded. 
These elements, set out in Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 
(Utah 1985) and Bundy v. Century Equip. Co.
 r Inc., 692 P. 2d 754 
(Utah 1984), show that when any of these elements are out of 
balance that the size of the punitive damage award is called into 
question. 
C. Analysis 
The facts supporting an award of punitive damages beyond the 
mere elements of the cause of action are scant. However, in an 
effort to marshall supporting facts, it can be said that the jury 
found that Mr. Turpin became intoxicated at The Putter Club and, 
consequently, caused the death of Mrs. Stalboerger. The primary 
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presentation of facts concerning punitive damages occurred through 
the testimony of the club manager only. In the transcript at page 
3076, the manager explains that there was not a program in effect 
to follow the number of drinks by cash customers. He also 
testified that the club policy was to stop serving drinks when 
someone appeared intoxicated. R., p. 3079. 
One searches the record in vain to find meaningful facts 
supporting the award of punitive damages against The Putter Club 
under the Johnson case. Specifically, there is no evidence that 
the management of The Putter Club authorized the bartender to serve 
alcohol to Mr. Turpin while he was intoxicated. In fact, Mr. 
Gilbert testified that he was not present at the time of the 
alleged incident and that all employees had been informed not to 
serve persons who were intoxicated. R., p. 3304, et seg. 
Next, no evidence exists in the record that the bartender was 
unfit in any way. 
Third, there is no evidence that the bartender, Dee Marsing, 
was employed in a managerial capacity of any kind. She was 
identified at the trial only as a bartender. R., p. 3002. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that a manager in 
any way ratified or approved what transpired. There was no 
evidence that the bartender even knew Turpin was driving. 
In summary, The Putter Club made a timely objection at trial 
that under Johnson there was absolutely no evidence available for 
the jury to make consideration of punitive damages against The 
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Putter Club. There was no showing of malice nor of any facts 
beyond the basic elements of the claim as required by Johnson 
Should the plaintiff be successful in overcoming this hurdle 
of the availability of punitive damages under Johnson, it is seen 
that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of 
$100,000. The evidence presented at trial in support of the amount 
of punitive damages commences on page 3515 of the record and 
consists solely of the testimony of Mr. Gilbert plus some financial 
statements he provided. If one marshals the facts and applies the 
standards recited above, it is seen that an award of $100,000 is 
grossly disproportionate to that allowed by law. 
Looking first at the evidence in support of the award, one 
cannot deny that the element of the effect on the lives of the 
parties is present. Mr. Stalboerger lost his wife and suffered 
tragic circumstances for which he was compensated in the original 
settlement and again by the jury. Also, a finding of service of 
liquor to one intoxicated is of concern when considering the nature 
of the alleged misconduct. Other supporting facts simply do not 
exist. 
The elements which fail to support the award are several. 
First, there is no evidence in the record of any likelihood of 
recurrence of the event. No evidence was presented that dram shop 
liability happened before this incident and, while evidence was 
presented that the club corporation continues in existence six 
years after the automobile accident, no subsequent incidents were 
identified. R., p. 3517. 
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Next, the plaintiff fails in presentation of evidence on the 
relative wealth of the defendant. The only evidence in support of 
the relative wealth of the defendant was trial exhibit numbers 36 
and 37, which consisted of operating statements of the club showing 
a million dollar revenue stream. As counsel for The Putter Club 
argued at trial, this revenue stream is misleading to a lay jury 
and does not constitute significant evidence of wealth. In fact, 
counsel for the plaintiff really asked the jury to speculate in his 
argument concerning these revenue statements by telling the jury 
that where one million dollars goes through a club that somebody 
must be making a lot of money. R., pp. 3535 - 3536. 
Contrary to the operating statements and contrary to the 
invitation to speculate by counsel for the plaintiff, the evidence 
showed that the club was not wealthy and could not afford a 
$100,000 punitive damage award. First, The Putter Club was a non-
profit organization organized under Utah law prohibiting the taking 
of a profit from the club. See, Gilbert testimony, pp. 3517 -
3518. Gilbert also testified that during the last couple of years 
before the trial that the club was in a loss position. R. , p. 
3526. Gilbert further testified that the loss was of sufficient 
severity that he did not take a draw for salary for two years. R. , 
p. 3527. Finally, Gilbert testified that the effect of the 
compensatory damage award would be to put the corporation out of 
business because the total assets of the corporation were only 
about $6,000 against a compensatory damage award of $487,000. R., 
pp. 3528, 3532. 
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In summary, a $100,000 damage award was entered against a 
corporation not allowed to make a profit by law, that was in a loss 
position, that had net assets of $6,000 to $7,000 and would be 
forced out of business by the compensatory damage award. These 
elements are clearly contrary to the standards for determining the 
size of an award in punitive damages. The $100,000 was clearly an 
emotional reaction to the tragic death caused by a drunk driver 
rather than tied to any reasonable element measuring damages. The 
district court erred in not eliminating or remitting the punitive 
damage award to an amount under, perhaps, half of the net assets of 
$6,000. 
Assuming the plaintiff overcomes all of the substantial legal 
difficulty given above and punitive damages are held to be 
available, the damage award should be reduced by remittitur for 
further proceedings to be put in line with the applicable legal 
doctrine and the facts of the financial circumstances of the club 
corporation. 
VII. THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
INFORMED ABOUT OTHER SETTLEMENTS 
A. Facts 
As has been discussed in considerable detail above in 
connection with the release issues, plaintiff Stalboerger received 
settlements of $168,000 from other defendants prior to trial while 
the Scurlock children received $37,500 total. The Putter Club 
asked the court to advise the jury of the related settlements. R. , 
p. 1617. These settlements would include the settlement of the 
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Scurlock children because of the unitary measure of damages under 
the One Action Rule. The court denied the request. R., p. 1713. 
At trial, jury instruction 19A, R. , p. 1955, instructed the 
jury that they should consider the value of the decedent to all of 
her heirs. See, Addendum "N". This instruction was an obvious 
attempt to comply with the One Action Rule discussed above. The 
defense counsel objected repeatedly to the presentation of evidence 
of damage not balanced out by informing the jury that substantial 
sums of money had already been obtained by the heirs. R., pp. 3100 
- 3102, 346, 2824 - 2825, 2859 - 2860. These continued objections 
combined with the a number of references to other litigation led to 
the court advising the jury that there had been other litigation 
and settlement, but not telling the jury the amount of that 
settlement. R., pp. 3373 - 3374. 
B. Applicable law 
In Slusher v. Ospital
 r 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a tort action in which multiple defendants 
had entered a settlement agreement and a remaining defendant went 
to trial. The court stated: 
Where an injured plaintiff and one or more, 
but not all, defendant tort-feasors enter into 
a settlement agreement, the parties must 
promptly inform the court and the other par-
ties to the action of the existence of the 
agreement and of its terms. Where the action 
is tried by a jury, the court shall, upon 
motion of a party, disclose the existence and 
basic content of the agreement to the jury 
unless the jury finds that, on the facts 
particular to the case, such disclosure will 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, 
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of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury. (Emphasis added). 
A reading of Slusher shows that the rationale of the court was 
that juries ought to be fully informed of what is occurring in the 
case so that the decision rendered might be truly reflective of 
both the legal and factual setting of the case. As is shown below, 
the failure to follow this rule worked real prejudice against The 
Putter Club. 
C. Analysis 
The order of the court to not discuss settlement amounts at 
trial works prejudice against The Putter Club. The advising of the 
jury that there was a settlement and then not allowing the jury be 
told the amount of the settlement is directly contrary to the 
operation of the One Action Rule. The jury was not allowed to 
determine total loss of the heirs, fix Stalboerger's share of that 
loss, and give credit for all the settlements to reach a final 
figure. 
In short, the half-way approach of the district court to tell 
the jury that there were settlements but not tell them the full 
amount was directly contrary to the policies expressed in Slusher. 
That is, the jury could not consider and determine the full measure 
of damages for this wrongful death action because they had 
insufficient information. This court should reverse the damage 
award and remand the case for a determination of the correct amount 
of damages by a jury that is fully informed of all of the available 
information. 
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VIII. REMARKS OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IN REBUTTAL 
MERIT REVERSAL OF THE DAMAGE AWARD 
A. Facts 
The jury was first allowed to retire and deliberate concerning 
special and general damages and then a separate proceeding was held 
to consider punitive damages. Before the first jury deliberation 
in the rebuttal portion of the closing argument of the plaintiff, 
counsel stated as follows, as found at R., p. 3503: 
I would like to point out to you that this is 
probably also your one time to be heard. I 
doubt you will ever be in this position again. 
It's your one time to make a difference in how 
many drunks bars put on the highways of this 
state. By the decisions that you make here, 
you will send a message — several messages in 
this community. If you rule in favor of The 
Putter Club in this case, you will send a 
message not only to The Putter Club, but all 
other servers of alcohol in this state that 
what they did was okay. It's okay to trade 
thirty bucks for a woman's life. 
If you rule against The Putter Club, you will 
send a message that if you want that thirty 
dollars, you are going to have to answer for 
this. The amount of damages that you award in 
this case also will be an expression of some 
more messages, that human life is important, 
that it doesn't matter how many bad things you 
can come up with, that you can't take a basi-
cally good person [and do injury.] . . . 
Immediately upon completion of that argument, counsel for the 
defense moved for a mistrial. Defendant then moved for a new trial 
under Rule 59 because of the highly inflammatory prejudicial nature 
of this statement. R., p. 1982 and 3509. 
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B. Analysis 
In considering a Motion for New Trial for attorney misconduct, 
the trial judge has broad latitude and will not be overturned on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Nelson v. Trujillof 657 P. 2d 
730 (Utah 1982). There is a presumption that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion unless the record clearly shows 
otherwise. Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). 
A similar situation was considered in Donohue v. Intermountain 
Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987). In that medical 
malpractice proceeding, plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury what 
the court characterized as "clearly improper" arguments which 
attempted to appeal to the social or economic prejudices of the 
jury. Counsel asked them to consider their responsibility of 
evaluating an individual against the "strong and the mighty" of 
society. The court denounced counsel's remarks motivated to stir 
up the jury emotionally and designed to elicit sympathy or inspire 
passion or prejudice which should not be allowed. See, also, Eager 
V. Willis. 410 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1966). 
As stated in Maercks v. Birchansky, 549 So.2d 199 (Fla. App. 
1989), the "send a message" argument has the effect of injecting 
punitive damages into a case where they would not otherwise be 
allowed. See, also, Fisher v. Mcllroy, 739 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 
1987) and Halftown v. Triple D Leasing Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 514 
(1982). The "send a message" comments of plaintiff's counsel in 
this case is particularly prejudicial because of the two phases of 
the damage hearing. What plaintiff's counsel did was introduce and 
48 
invite the jury to award punitive damages in the compensatory 
portion of the case and then invite the jury again in the punitive 
damage deliberations to again punish the defendant. 
As with Donohue, this court should hold that the district 
court clearly abused its discretion in allowing the "send a 
message" argument to stand. Timely objection was made immediately 
after the statement at a time when the court could have instructed 
the jury again of the appropriate measure of damages or otherwise 
eliminate the prejudicial nature of the statements. The statements 
inviting passion and prejudice are no more proper in this case than 
under the facts recited in Donohue. This court should reverse the 
judgment and remand it for a new hearing on damages. 
CONCLUSION 
This Brief has shown the court that the claims against The 
Putter Club were defective from the very beginning. Tactical 
decisions by plaintiff's counsel combined with multiple judges on 
interrelated claims has resulted in the very evils which the legal 
doctrines examined above were intended to avoid. The Putter Club 
found itself exposed to multiple lawsuits in violation of the One 
Action Rule and contrary to the plain language of a release by the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff was allowed to ignore the nature of his fraud 
lawsuit so as to achieve a double recovery through the multiple 
cases. The defendants were not allowed a full and fair hearing 
when they were gagged with respect to advising the jury of the 
multiple settlements that had occurred and when they became the 
victim of a plea to passion and prejudice. 
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The Putter Club suffered a wrong verdict not only because of 
pleas to passion and prejudice, but also because the court allowed 
the award of punitive damages in a case in which they are not 
legally available. Even if one was to assume punitive damages are 
legally available, the award made was disproportionate to the 
evidence presented of the relative wealth of the defendant. 
The Putter Club is aware that the multiple issues presented 
could result in a variety of resolutions by this court. A matrix 
showing the legal effect of applying the legal doctrines discussed 
in this Brief is included in the Addendum to aid the court in its 
evaluation. 
The court is requested to reverse the judgment. 
DATED this /!** day of November, 1992. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
G R E G O R Y ^ 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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